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Abstract: Automated People Movers (APM) are systems for passenger transport with fully automated operation and 
high frequency service. For this study, we proposed the adaptation of the standard IEC 61850 (design to be 
used in electric power systems based in intelligent electronic devices) to allow its application to an APM 
system named Aeromovel installed in Porto Alegre, Brazil. Aeromovel is a nonconventional Automatic 
People Mover whose operation principle is based on pneumatics. This paper proposes the use of two 
analysis techniques, Simulation and Formal Verification, in order to guarantee the desired behaviour for an 
APM propulsion system composed by a centrifugal fan and ten (on-off and proportional) pneumatic valves 
driven by pneumatic pistons. This approach is based on the use of timed automata and UPPAAL software.  
1 INTRODUCTION 
An Automated People Mover (APM) is a fully 
automated, grade-separated mass transit system. The 
term is generally used only to describe systems 
serving relatively small areas, such as airports, 
downtown districts or theme parks, but is sometimes 
applied to considerably more complex automated 
systems. Usually they circulate in headways that do 
not interfere with other traffic ways in order to 
guarantee safety for passengers and security for the 
system (IEEE, 2004).  
An APM performs automatically the control of 
movement, the execution of the safety instructions 
and the direction of the trains. The automatic 
accomplishment of these functions is assured by the 
Automated Train Controller (ATC) system that is 
composed by the following sub-systems: ATP - 
Automatic Train Protection, ATO - Automatic Train 
Operation and ATS - Automatic Train Supervision. 
In order to guarantee the communication among 
these systems, the standard IEEE Standard for 
Communications-Based Train Control (CBTC) 
Performance and Functional Requirements (IEEE, 
2004) must be followed. This standard describes the 
functional requirements and also the 
communications performance concerning the 
described controller systems of the APM 
(Communications Based Train Control - CBTC).  
For example, to activate the train braking system, 
it is needed that the central control has information, 
constantly updated, about the speed and current 
location of each vehicle on the highway and the time 
required for activation of the brake system, in order 
to perform the stopping under the deceleration curve 
thereby avoiding the collision between vehicles. 
For integration of the ATC, it is used the 
standard IEEE Standard for Communications 
Protocol Aboard Trains (IEEE, 1999) that defines 
the communication protocol between vehicles and 
 inner vehicles. This standard defines two solutions 
according to the application: the protocol 1473-L 
(LonWorks) and 1473-T (TCN). 
In Sullivan (2001) there was observed, in the 
types 1473-L and 1473-T, the lack of support for 
new demands for video transmission, the missing of 
IP interfaces preventing communication via 
Ethernet, for example, and the lack of protocols used 
for systems integration Advanced Train Control 
System (ATCS). 
According to Hewings (2008) protection system 
and train control is traditionally based on wired and 
centralized circuits. Although they generally have a 
simple design, there are serious difficulties in the 
installation and maintenance. As there is increased 
demand on the system, there are advantages in 
choosing an open architecture, with a simple 
communication system. These concepts are largely 
addressed in the development of IEC 61850, 
designed to be a communication standard for 
electrical substations based on the use of IEDs 
(Intelligent Electronic Devices), which occupy the 
place of older protective relays, combining functions 
of protection, control and communication in the 
same equipment. In general, its application results in 
the following benefits (Hewings, 2008): 
• Reduced cabling. 
• Reducing the cost and installation time. 
• Increased capacity for monitoring and control 
systems protection. 
• Separate infrastructure from functionality. 
• Interoperability. 
The IEC 61850 standard has requirements such 
as real-time control and distributed object 
orientation and provides a standard for integration of 
substations from specification of reporting 
requirements, functional characteristics, data 
structure and the nomenclature for devices and data. 
It also provides standards for operational 
characteristics, such as how to interact with the 
applications of control devices and how they should 
be tested for compliance of the system. 
Currently, there are applications in the areas of 
hydropower, wind energy and distributed generation. 
It is proposed, in the present study, the expansion of 
the IEC 61850 standard to APM systems, 
performing a control CBTC.  
The application of all IEC 61850 requirements to 
an Automated People Mover’s Controller is a large 
and very complex task. The approach that seems to 
accomplish the goals of this large project is to use, 
first, skills in modelling, creating a large global 
model that must consider the communication 
protocols proposed by the standard and guaranteeing 
the accomplishment of all time delays; second, to 
simulate the very large model using appropriated 
tools and software; and, third, to use Formal 
Verification techniques in order to guarantee a set of 
behaviours defined by the standard. 
As it is an ongoing work, this paper presents 
some aspects related with the communication 
protocols – proposed by the IEC 61850 standard – 
and aspects related with Simulation and Formal 
Verification of the communications requirements 
specified by those protocols.  
Considering the IEC 61850 standard protocols, 
the GOOSE (Generic Object Oriented Substation 
Event) is the first one being analyzed. The 
Automated People Mover that is treated in this study 
uses pneumatic power for displacement, in which 
the combination of a pneumatic propulsion system 
control and the control of a set of on-off and 
proportional valves is crucial to guarantee the 
system dependability. 
In order to handle with this complex problem, 
the main idea is to use, in a complementary way, 
Simulation and Formal Verification analysis 
techniques (Machado et al. 2011) 
Several formalisms can be used to model timed 
systems. Timed automata were adopted as the 
modelling formalism for system modelling due to 
two main reasons: first, the study of the proposed 
system needs to take time into account; and, second, 
it is the input formalism of the UPPAAL model-
checker (Behrmann et al., 2004). Even if UPPAAL 
is a Model-Checker, in this step of this very large 
project, and specifically in this paper, it is used, 
only, as a Simulator. As the next step of our 
approach is to use Formal Verification Technique, 
we believe that it is a good solution for this task.  
In order to achieve the main goals of this paper 
the Section 2 presents the case study; Section 3 
presents the GOOSE protocol model; Section 4 is 
devoted to presentation of the simulation results and 
finally, Section 5, presents some conclusions about 
the study presented herein. 
2 CASE STUDY: AEROMOVEL 
The main features of the technology are the 
exclusive Aeromovel traffic on the route, the high 
ratio of useful load/weight carried and external 
traction. These characteristics are due, respectively, 
of the fact that car travel above ground in a unique 
way and have external power system. This makes it 
relatively lighter than other similar transportation 
systems, allowing less robustness for the beams 
 where it operates, reducing the costs of construction, 
installation and maintenance of the system. 
The power unit, known as power train group or 
propulsion system, is responsible for generating 
pressure differential and is basically composed of an 
asynchronous electric motor that drives the 
industrial centrifugal fan. Each power train group is 
connected to the main duct through a pipeline with 
1m2 of cross-sectional area. 
The proposed fluidic power system (Fig. 1) 
consists of an industrial centrifugal fan (with air 
flow of up to 106m3/h) and a set of two proportional 
valves (VP0 and VP1) that allow control of pressure 
and consequently the force imposed on the vehicle 
and eight on-off valves (V0, V1,…,V7) They allow 
the effect of the fan switch on the main duct through 
which the vehicle moves, and can perform inflation 
or exhaust air as seen in Fig. 1. The valves used in 
the Aeromovel system are characterized by causing 
obstruction of flow from angular movement. 
Pneumatic pistons are used to rotate the flaps of the 
valve due to high flow rates involved. 
 
Figure 1. Layout of power train group - Push to Left 
 
3 GOOSE PROTOCOL MODEL 
In order to detail the explanation of the study 
realized, this paper presents, only, the study of one 
to one GOOSE messages. It must be highlighted 
that all the system (controller and plant, in closed-
loop behaviour) was modelled and the entire model 
is composed by sixty-two (62) timed finite 
automaton modules. 
The train control system is usually centralized, 
but, aiming a solution based on the IEC 61850 
standard (Hewings, 2008), the models were 
developed based on distributed controllers so, in 
the models, it is considered real-time dedicated to 
each individual device. The units are connected to 
a communication bus that provides information 
exchange with other processing unit responsible 
for interfacing with the user, thus reducing the 
processing request individually. In general, the 
decision to use a distributed control system is 
motivated by cost reduction and increased system 
flexibility and control, in this particular case, the 
distance between the elements of the system. 
Models of plant system devices and controllers 
were developed using timed automata formalism 
and analyzed using UPPAAL software for 
simulation. The model was divided into the 
following templates: Goose Server, Goose Client, 
Bus and Logical Node. 
With respect to the implemented GOOSE 
protocol model, were taken in account the 
following characteristics (see Fig. 2): 
• The messages are asynchronous and 
unsolicited; 
• The GOOSE protocol is encapsulated 
directly in Ethernet layer. The messages are 
connectionless so the model does not verify 
the connection stability (without 
confirmation from receivers).  
• The messages are multicast. To the multicast 
only clients or servers in the same VLAN 
(virtual LAN) can send or listen packages. 
Must be a Bus Model to each VLAN (the 
template model has facilities to do this 
configuration). 
• How there isn’t confirmation from receivers, 
the retransmission is used to increase the 
probability of successful reception. 
 
Figure 2. Goose Server Model 
 
 The Bus Model has a FIFO (First In, First Out) 
queue with 4 ms (milliseconds) delay and the total 
delays of frames flow introduced by network and 
communication processors are allocated only in the 
Bus Model (typical GOOSE total transfer time is 
4ms) (see Fig. 3).  
 
Figure 3. Communications Delay 
 
The Gosse Server has three basic states: NON-
EXISTENT, RETRANSMIT-PENDING and 
RETRANSMIT. In the case of Logical Node has 
been configured to send Goose Messages 
(GoEna==true) the server transmit the first 
package setting SqNum to 0 (this variable will be 
incremented for each transmission, but will 
rollover to 1 and set to zero when StNum is 
updated), StNum to 1 (this variable is used to 
define how many times the equipment has changed 
state) and timeAllowedtoLive to 2 (this variables 
are in the structure called SendGooseMessage). 
The time to wait for the next transmission 
(timeAllowedtoLive) is set to 2n (n=1) and is 
incremented by n+1 until 1024ms. 
The Fig. 4 shows the waiting time for the next 
re-transmission when th is the heartbeat time 
(1024ms), t0 is an indeterminate time by an 
asynchronous changing status, t1 is 21 ms, t2 is 22 
ms, t3 is 23 ms, t4 is 24 ms and so forward. 
 
Figure 4. Time to wait for the next re-transmission. 
 
Goose Server send messages to Bus Model by 
copying the struct SendGooseMessage to struct 
busGsePdu (according VLAN) and send a signal 
by channel to Bus Model. The Bus Model receives 
the signal and copies the busGsePdu structure to a 
queue and does a time registry. After the delay (4 
ms) the Bus Model remove the data from the queue 
and copy again to busGsePdu structure, sending a 
broadcast channel to all Goose Clients which are 
listening the VLAN.  The Bus Model is the same 
to Sample Value and Goose Messages, but has 
difference in the queue because those messages 
have different structures. 
The Goose Clients receive by broadcast 
channel signal and copy the busGsePdu structure 
to local memory, verifying interest (initially 
configured). If has not interest the data is discarded 
and the Goose Client comeback to the listen state. 
If it is important information arriving, then the 
Goose Client model call the Logical Node 
Controller do the necessary actions and comeback 
to the listen state. 
4 SIMULATION RESULTS 
For all the models, the range of all variables has 
been limited in order to decrease the necessary 
computational capacity to obtain results, when 
executing formal verification tasks. For all the 
locations of the entire automata model - with 
exception of the "committed" locations - it is 
necessary a time interval to allow evolutions, in all 
automaton models, from a location to another 
location.  
Concerning simulation results, the data of the 
file XTR (simulation registry) have been used to 
obtain the diagram of Fig. 5. In this figure, it is 
possible to see the retransmission messages by the 
increment of the SqNum and stNum variables in the 
time. The simulated behavior is the expected one 
for this system. However, the step considered - 
after this one – will be to consider also formal 
verification in order to be sure about the behavior 
of the Goose communications.  
At this moment, formal verification has been 
used only for deadlock violation (formal 
description: “A[] not deadlock”), with DBM - 
Difference Bounded Matrices (Dill, 1989) state 
space representation, but not yet considered, 
concerning all the system with GOOSE protocol, 
because the model of the system is now a very 
large and complex model - composed by sixty-two 
(62) modules - and the computational capacity that 
we have available is not enough to obtain results. 
To solve this problem, it will be necessary to use 
partial formal verification (Holzmann, 1991 and 
Holzmann, 1998) and/or abstraction modeling 
techniques (Balarin, 1996) to handle with this very 
large model, in order to obtain Formal Verification 
results. 
 Figure 5. Simulation Results. 
 
5 CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE 
WORK 
The use of simulation and formal verification 
techniques for analysis of the studied APM 
controller was very helpful and allowed us 
obtaining good results for studying the IEC 61850 
GOOSE protocol. 
With this study, it is shown, in this paper that a 
distributed controller - corresponding at a part of a 
complex system - has been verified and it is 
concluded, also, that the controller accomplishes 
the main behavior desired for the system and the 
delays proposed by IEC 61850 standard.  
All range of variables, in the models, are used 
in conformance with IEC 61850. However, in 
order to accomplish the next step of our work - 
formal verification of the entire model - reducing 
variable size will be possible to improve formal 
verification performance, because it decreases the 
time and memory consuming used to do the formal 
verifications. For example, stNum has 232 bytes but 
we intend to use it with 28 bytes because the 
functionality is the same. 
As future work, other partial controllers will be 
verified - concerning the same system - and, 
finally, an abstraction of each part of the controller 
will be verified in order to guarantee the desired 
behavior for the system, considering all the 
distributed controller system. 
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